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Abstract In this paper we develop a novel propositional semantics based on the
framework of branching time. The basic idea is to replace the moment-history pairs
employed as parameters of truth in the standard Ockhamist semantics by pairs con-
sisting of a moment and a consistent, downward closed set of so-called transitions.
Whereas histories represent complete possible courses of events, sets of transitions
can represent incomplete parts thereof as well. Each transition captures one of the
alternative immediate future possibilities open at a branching point. The transition
semantics exploits the structural resources a branching time structure has to offer and
provides a fine-grained picture of the interrelation of modality and time. In addition to
temporal and modal operators, a so-called stability operator becomes interpretable as
a universal quantifier over the possible future extensions of a given transition set. The
stability operator allows us to specify how and how far time has to unfold for the truth
value of a sentence at a moment to become settled and enables a perspicuous treat-
ment of future contingents. We show that the semantics developed along those lines
generalizes and extends extant approaches: both Peirceanism and Ockhamism can be
viewed as limiting cases of the transition approach that build on restricted resources
only, and on both accounts, stability collapses into truth.
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The interaction of modality and time became a topic of formal investigation early on in
the development of tense logic byPrior (1957).The initial suggestionwas to understand
modality in terms of quantification over moments in a linear temporal structure—
the so-called Diodorean modality. Kripke suggested a branching representation of
the interaction of modality and time instead.1 Formal languages based on branching
time structures were studied in Prior (1967), and Thomason (1970) contains the first
detailed overview of a logic based on those structures. Branching time structures allow
for a direct representation of alternative future possibilities, all of which share some
common past. Formally, a branching time structure is defined as a non-empty strict
partial ordering ofmoments that is connected and left-linear. Eachmaximal linear set of
moments in such an ordering represents a history, a complete possible course of events.
The crucial point in developing a propositional semantics on a branching time
structure consists in specifying appropriate truth conditions for the future operator. At
a given moment, there may be more than one possibility for the future, with nothing
yet deciding between them.2 For concreteness assume that you have purchased a ticket
for tomorrow’s lottery. Given that the outcome of the drawing is in fact objectively
indeterminate, it is both possible that your ticket will win and that your ticket will lose,
with nothing yet to tip the balance. Whether your ticket will win or lose, depends on
how the future unfolds, or more precisely, on the outcome of tomorrow’s drawing.
There are two popular semantic approaches based on the framework of branching
time. Prior (1967) refers to them as Peirceanism and Ockhamism. On the Peircean
account, the semantic evaluation is relativized to a moment parameter only, and the
future operator requires a witness in every possible future continuation of the moment
of evaluation. Truth coincides with inevitability. In our lottery example, the Peircean
semantics renders both the sentence “Your ticket will win” and the sentence “Your
ticket will lose” false at any moment preceding the drawing.
The Ockhamist account, on the other hand, makes use of a history as a second para-
meter of truth next to the moment parameter and thereby generalizes Peirceanism.
Modal operators become interpretable as quantifiers over histories, and truth and
inevitability come apart. In the case of the future operator, the moment of evalua-
tion is simply shifted forward on the given history, just as in linear tense logic. In our
example, at any moment before the drawing, the sentence “Your ticket will win” is
true with respect to one history, while the contrary prediction “Your ticket will lose”
is true with respect to another history, rendering both outcomes possible.
The semantics we are proposing generalizes and extends both Peirceanism and
Ockhamism. The basic idea is to replace the moment-history pairs employed as para-
meters of truth in the Ockhamist semantics by pairs consisting of a moment and a
consistent, downward closed set of so-called transitions. Each transition captures one
1 See Ploug and Øhrstrøm (2012) for the Kripke-Prior letters of 1958 and Øhrstrøm and Hasle (2011) for
a broader overview.
2 So-called Thin Red Line approaches [as, for example, put forth in Øhrstrøm (2009)], which single out
one of the possible futures as ‘the real future’, will be ignored here. For a critical discussion of the Thin
Red Line, see Belnap et al. (2001), ch. 6.
123
Transition Semantics for Branching Time 79
of the alternative immediate future possibilities open at a branching point. Whereas
histories represent complete possible courses of events, sets of transitions can rep-
resent incomplete parts thereof as well. Our future operator has both Peircean and
Ockhamist traits: it demands a future witness in every possible future continuation
of the moment of evaluation that is an extension of the given transition set. In addi-
tion to temporal and modal operators, we introduce a so-called stability operator into
our language, which is interpreted as a universal quantifier over the possible future
extensions of a given transition set. With that operator at our disposal, we cannot only
express that, at any moment before the drawing, it is both possible that your ticket will
win and that your ticket will lose, but also specify how and how far time has to unfold
for things to become settled one way or the other. Truth and stability come apart. At
any moment before the drawing, the sentences “Your ticket will win” and “Your ticket
will lose” are neither stably-true nor stably-false but contingent with respect to the
past course of events up to that moment. Their truth values only stabilize as the future
unfolds. It is the drawing that constitutes the relevant tipping point: with respect to
any incomplete course of events that encompasses one of the possible outcomes of
tomorrow’s drawing, each of our sentences is either stably-true or stably-false at any
moment before the drawing. Any incomplete course of events that captures one of the
possible outcomes of the drawing suffices to settle matter, even though there might be
several histories that contain the very same outcome of the drawing and differ only
with respect to what will happen hundreds or thousands of years hence.
By exploiting the structural resources a branching time structure has to offer, the
transition semantics allows for a fine-grained picture of the interrelation of modal-
ity and time. With its stability operator, it enables a perspicuous treatment of future
contingents and gains expressive means that are not available on extant accounts. We
show that the semantics developed along those lines generalizes and extends both
Peirceanism and Ockhamism: both accounts can be viewed as limiting cases of the
transition approach, and Peircean and Ockhamist validity are definable in the tran-
sition semantics. Both Peirceanism and Ockhamism are obtained by restricting the
range of transition sets that are taken into account in the semantic evaluation, and on
both accounts, stability collapses into truth.
The paper is structured as follows: in Sect. 2 we introduce the framework of branch-
ing time and briefly discuss the Peircean and the Ockhamist account. In Sect. 3 we
define the notion of a transition and that of a consistent, downward closed transition
set. We then provide the recursive semantic clauses of the transition semantics we
are proposing and illustrate how sentences about the future are treated within that
semantic framework. In Sect. 4 we show that the transition approach generalizes both
Peirceanism andOckhamism and illustrate how it extends extant accounts by its notion
of stability.
2 Branching Time
In this sectionwe introduce the notion of a branching time structure (Sect. 2.1), provide
a general definition of a branching time model and briefly discuss the Peircean and
the Ockhamist account (Sect. 2.2).
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2.1 Branching Time Structures
In the Prior-Thomason theory of branching time, the modal-temporal structure of the
world is represented as a tree of histories that share some common past and branch
toward the future. We define a branching time structure as a non-empty strict partial
ordering of moments, M = 〈M,<〉, such that (BT1) the temporal ordering < on M is
left-linear, (BT2) any two moments in M have a greatest common lower bound in M ,
and (BT3) M has nomaximal elements. Condition (BT1) captures the idea that the past
is fixed while the future is open. It requires the partial ordering to be tree-like: there is
no backward branching. Condition (BT2) first of all secures the unity of the structure
by demanding the temporal ordering < to be connected: any two moments have a
common lower bound. The requirement that there be a greatest common lower bound
in each case is inserted here as it allows us to define branching points, which figure
as the initials of our transitions, in a perspicuous way. Condition (BT3) expresses the
idea that time does not end, i.e., there is no last moment. As usual, we use m ≤ m′ to
stand for (m < m′ or m = m′).
Definition 1 (BT structure) A BT structure M = 〈M,<〉 is a non-empty strict partial
order (i.e. a set M = ∅ together with a relation < that is irreflexive, asymmetric and
transitive) such that
(BT1) for all m,m′,m′′ ∈ M , if m′ < m and m′′ < m, then m′ ≤ m′′ or m′′ ≤ m′;
(BT2) for all m,m′ ∈ M , there is some m′′ ∈ M s.t. m′′ ≤ m, m′′ ≤ m′ and for all
m′′′ ∈ M , if m′′′ ≤ m and m′′′ ≤ m′, then m′′′ ≤ m′′;
(BT3) for all m ∈ M , there is some m′ ∈ M s.t. m < m′.
We do not place any further restrictions on the earlier-later relation < that represents
the temporal ordering of moments. We allow it to be discrete, dense or continuous.
While discrete structures are important for applications in computer science, in a
more general setting triggered by philosophical considerations, dense and continuous
structures should be allowed for as well.
A set of moments is modally consistent if it is possible that those moments co-
occur within a single possible course of events, viz. if the set is linearly ordered via
<. For M = 〈M,<〉 a BT structure, a history is a maximal linear subset of M . As a
maximal <-chain in M , a history is a maximal modally consistent set of moments and
represents a complete possible course of events.
Definition 2 (History) Given a BT structure M = 〈M,<〉, a set h ⊆ M is a history
iff h is a maximal linear subset in M , i.e. a subset that is linearly ordered via <
(for all m,m′ ∈ h, m ≤ m′ or m′ ≤ m) and such that there is no proper superset
h′  h in M that is linearly ordered via < as well. The set of histories in M is denoted
by hist(M ). For a moment m ∈ M , the set of histories containing m is denoted by
Hm ; so Hm = {h ∈ hist(M ) | m ∈ h}.
Due to the absence of backward branching (BT1), histories are downward closed: a
history h contains for any moment m ∈ h, all moments m′ in that moment’s past,
i.e., if m ∈ h and m′ < m, then m′ ∈ h. In particular, we thus have that if m′ ≤ m,
then Hm ⊆ Hm′ . The fact that histories are downward closed implies together with
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condition (BT2) that the intersection of any two histories is non-empty and contains a
greatest element. This greatest element constitutes a branching point. Condition (BT1)
and (BT2) of Definition 1 thus jointly assure that any two histories branch at some
moment.
2.2 Branching Time Semantics
BT structures can be employed in the semantics of formal languages containing tem-
poral and modal operators—in fact, the branching time framework was developed
for those semantic purposes in the context of Prior’s tense logic. The languages
we consider throughout this paper—the Peircean, the Ockhamist and the transition
language—each extend the standard propositional language L (with propositional
variables and the usual Boolean connectives) by a certain set of temporal and/or modal
operators. The semantics of those three languages differ with respect to which struc-
tural elements—over and above a moment of evaluation—are employed as parameters
of truth in the recursive semantic machinery. We spell out the definition of a branching
time model and the recursive semantic clauses for the truth-functional connectives in
full generality, using “I ” to stand for the respective set of indices of evaluation and “ı”
for one such index in I, which includes at least a moment parameter. We denote the set
of propositional variables of the basic propositional language L by At and make use
of negation ¬ and conjunction ∧ as the only primitive truth-functional connectives.
A BT model is defined as a pair M = 〈M, v〉, where M = 〈M,<〉 is a BT structure
and v a valuation function that assigns truth values to the propositional variables p ∈ At
relative to an index of evaluation ı ∈ I.3
Definition 3 (BT model) A BT model M = 〈M, v〉 is a BT structure M = 〈M,<〉
together with a valuation function v : At × I → {0, 1}.
The truth of a sentence φ ∈ L in a model M = 〈M, v〉 at an index of evaluation ı ∈ I,
in symbols: M, ı  φ, is now defined recursively:
(At) M, ı  p iff v(p, ı) = 1;
(¬) M, ı  ¬φ iff M, ı  φ;
(∧) M, ı  φ ∧ ψ iff M, ı  φ and M, ı  ψ .
The semantic clauses for the particular temporal and/or modal operators, that extend
the valuation on the sentences of L to all sentences of the respective language, are
provided as those languages are specified in detail.
Asmentioned above, themost popular semantic approaches based on the framework
of branching time arewhat Prior (1967) calls thePeircean and theOckhamist approach,
and we now briefly discuss them in turn.4
3 From a philosophical perspective, it might seem favorable to assume that the truth values of the proposi-
tional variables depend only on the moment parameter, presupposing that atomic sentences do not contain
traces of modality or futurity. In order to preserve the substitution property of the resulting logic, however,
we have the truth values of the propositional variables in a BT model depend on all parameters of truth.




The Peircean language Lp extends the propositional language L by a future operator
Fp and a past operator Pp. On the Peircean account, the recursive semantic machinery
is relativized to a single parameter of truth: the semantic evaluation on a BT structure
M = 〈M,<〉 depends solely on a moment of evaluation m ∈ M . The semantic
clause for the future operator Fp universally quantifies over all histories containing
the moment of evaluation, demanding a future witness in every single one of them.
That is, a sentence of the formFpφ is true at a momentm ∈ M iff every history passing
throughm contains some later momentm′ > m at which φ is true. The semantic clause
for the past operator Pp is straightforward: a sentence of the form Ppφ is true at a
moment m ∈ M iff φ is true at some earlier moment m′ < m. Since every moment
has a unique past, no universal quantification is needed in that case.
Below the semantic clauses for the future operator Fp and past operator Pp are
provided. We use M,m p φ in order to indicate that a sentence φ ∈ Lp is true at
a moment m in a Peircean model M = 〈M, vp〉 on a BT structure M = 〈M,<〉 with
vp : At × M → {0, 1} according to the Peircean semantics.
(Fp) M,m p Fpφ iff for all h ∈ Hm , there is some m′ ∈ h s.t. m′ > m and
M,m′ p φ;
(Pp) M,m p Ppφ iff there is some m′ < m s.t. M,m′ p φ.
2.2.2 Ockhamism
TheOckhamist languageLo enriches the propositional languageL by a future opera-
tor Fo and a past operator Po, as well as by an operator for inevitability, or settledness,
o. On theOckhamist account, the semantic evaluation on aBT structureM = 〈M,<〉
depends on a history as a second parameter of truth next to the moment parameter.
That is, truth at a moment of evaluation is relativized to a complete possible course
of events. Sentences are evaluated at moment-history pairs m/h, where m ∈ M and
h ∈ Hm . In the case of the temporal operators Fo and Po, the moment of evaluation
is shifted forward or backward, respectively, on the given history, just as in linear
tense logic. A sentence of the form Foφ is true at a moment-history pair m/h iff the
history h contains a later moment m′ > m at which φ is true with respect to h. The
past operator is interpreted analogously. Note that in the case of the past operator the
requirement m′ ∈ h can be dropped since histories are downward closed. We use
M,m/h o φ in order to indicate that a sentence φ ∈ Lo is true at a moment-history
pair m/h in an Ockhamist model M = 〈M, vo〉 on a BT structure M = 〈M,<〉
with vo : At × {m/h : m ∈ M and h ∈ Hm} → {0, 1} according to the Ockhamist
semantics.
(Fo) M,m/h o Foφ iff there is some m′ ∈ h s.t. m′ > m and M,m′/h o φ;
(Po) M,m/h o Poφ iff there is some m′ < m s.t. M,m′/h o φ.
Since the semantic evaluation is relativized to a history as a second parameter of
truth, modal operators become interpretable as quantifiers over the set of histories con-
taining the moment of evaluation. The inevitability operator o amounts to universal
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quantification. A modal operator for possibility, ♦o, can be defined as its dual, i.e.,
♦o := ¬o¬. The modality involved is S5.
(o) M,m/h o oφ iff for all h′ ∈ Hm,M,m/h′ o φ.
By making use of a history as a second parameter of truth next to the moment para-
meter, Ockhamism generalizes Peirceanism. Modal operators become interpretable,
and truth and inevitability come apart while they coincide on the Peircean account. On
the Ockhamist account, a sentence can be assigned different truth values at the very
same moment with respect to different histories. The Peircean future operator Fp is
equivalent to the composition oFo of Ockhamist operators. Due to the dependence
of the semantic evaluation at a moment on a history parameter, Ockhamism gains
expressive means that are not available on the Peircean account.
3 Transition Semantics
As said, by relativizing the semantic evaluation at a moment to a history parameter,
that specifies some possible course of events, Ockhamism generalizes Peirceanism.
Histories, however, represent complete possible courses of events, whereas in general
an incomplete possible course of events suffices for settling the truth or the falsity of a
sentence. In the lottery example that we considered in the introduction, it is the draw-
ing that constitutes the relevant tipping point: with respect to any incomplete course
of events that encompasses one of the possible outcomes of the drawing it is settled at
any moment before the drawing whether your ticket will win or lose. By replacing the
history parameter employed in the Ockhamist semantics by a consistent, downward
closed set of transitions, we allow the semantic evaluation to be relativized to incom-
plete possible courses of events as well. That sets of transitions can serve as a local
alternative to histories was suggested in Müller (2014). The transition semantics we
are proposing here goes significantly beyond that suggestion: by enriching the purely
temporal language considered in Müller (2014) by modal operators and a stability
operator, we obtain a language that is able to reflect the richness of the semantics.
The stability operator allows us to specify how and how far time has to unfold for the
truth value of a sentence at a moment to become settled and enables a perspicuous
treatment of future contingents. The semantics developed along those lines provides
a fine-grained picture of the interrelation of modality and time and generalizes and
extends both Peirceanism and Ockhamism.
In this section we first define the notion of a transition and that of a consistent,
downward closed transition set (Sect. 3.1). We then put forth the recursive semantic
clauses of the transition semantics we are proposing (Sect. 3.2) and illustrate how
sentences about the future are treated within that semantic framework (Sect. 3.3).
3.1 Transitions
Transitions provide a local alternative to histories.Whereas a history represents a com-
plete possible course of events, a transition captures one of the alternative immediate
future possibilities open at a branching point. When introducing the Prior-Thomason
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theory of branching time in Sect. 2.1 above, we said that the conditions (BT1) and
(BT2) in the definition of a branching time structure (Definition 1) jointly assure that
the intersection of any two histories is non-empty and contains a greatest element.
This greatest element constitutes a branching point. The definition of a BT structure
thus guarantees that any two histories branch at some moment. If the moment m is
a branching point, not all pairs of histories containing m need to branch at m, how-
ever; some might still continue to overlap for a certain while after m, in which case
they are said to be undivided-at-m. At each branching point, some pairs of histories
branch, others are undivided. For two histories to be undivided at a moment m, it is
both necessary and sufficient that they share some moment m′ later than m, which by
downward closedness of histories implies that they also share m.
Definition 4 (Undividedness-at-m and branching-at-m) Given a BT structure
M = 〈M,<〉 and a momentm ∈ M , two histories h, h′ ∈hist(M ) are undivided-at-m,
in symbols: h ≡m h′, iff there is some m′ ∈ M such that m′ > m and m′ ∈ h ∩ h′.
Two histories h, h′ ∈ hist(M ) branch-at-m, in symbols: h ⊥m h′, iff the momentm is
the greatest element in h ∩ h′ (i.e., m ∈ h ∩ h′ and for all m′ ∈ h ∩ h′, m′ ≤ m). If for
a moment m, there are histories h, h′ ∈ hist(M ) s.t. h ⊥m h′, we call m a branching
point.
Definition 4 implies that two histories that share some moment m are undivided-at-
m if and only if they do not branch-at-m. The relation of undividedness-at-m is an
equivalence relation on the setHm of histories containing themomentm and thus yields
a partition Πm of that set. The partition Πm of Hm is non-trivial, i.e., Πm = {Hm},
if and only if the moment m is a branching point. The equivalence class of a history
h ∈ Hm with respect to the relation of undividedness-at-m is denoted by [h]m , so
[h]m = {h′ ∈ Hm | h ≡m h′}. From the definition of undividedness it immediately
follows that all histories that share some moment m are undivided at any moment
m′ in that moment’s past: if h, h′ ∈ Hm and m′ < m, then h ≡m′ h′, and hence
Hm ⊆ [h]m′ = [h′]m′ . In particular, it holds that any two histories that are undivided
at some moment m are also undivided at any earlier moment m′: if h ≡m h′ and
m′ < m, then h ≡m′ h′, and consequently [h]m = [h′]m ⊆ [h]m′ = [h′]m′ .
The notion of a branching point and the relation of undividedness play a crucial
role in the definition of a transition. At each branching pointm, the setHm of histories
containingm is partitioned into sets of histories that are undivided-at-m, and each such
set specifies one of the possible immediate future continuations ofm. A transition links
a branching pointm to one such local future possibility H ∈ Πm . It picks out one of the
alternative immediate future possibilities open at that moment. We define a transition
as a pair 〈m, H〉, also written 〈m  H〉, consisting of a branching point m ∈ M and
a set of locally undivided histories H ∈ Πm .5 We call the moment m ∈ M the initial
of the transition 〈m  H〉 and the set of histories H ∈ Πm its outcome. For every
branching point m, there are at least two transitions that share the initial m but have
pairwise disjoint outcomes.
5 Transitions as defined here are a special case of the more general notion of a transition provided in Belnap
(2005), where a transition is defined as a pair 〈I, O〉 with I, O ⊆ M fulfilling certain conditions. For the
definition of the notion of a transition, see also Müller (2014).
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Definition 5 (Transition) For M = 〈M,<〉 a BT structure, a transition is a pair
〈m, H〉, also written 〈m  H〉, with m ∈ M a branching point and H ∈ Πm . The
moment m is the initial and the set of histories H the outcome of the transition
〈mH〉. The set of transitions in M is denoted by trans(M ).6
The complexity of the definition of a transition is due to the fact that the definition is
intended to be general enough to accommodate the case of dense and continuous BT
structures. In case M = 〈M,<〉 is discrete, so that for every branching point m ∈ M ,
there is a non-singleton set succ(m) of immediate successors ofm, a transition can be
defined as a pair of moments 〈m,m′〉 with m′ ∈ succ(m). This is the kind of notion
of a transition that is prevalent in computer science, where primarily discrete structure
are studied. If the BT structure under consideration is not discrete, however, transitions
cannot generally be defined as pairs of moments. In order to see this, consider a BT
structure that contains a history h isomorphic to the real numbers R such that at any
moment mi ∈ h with i ∈ R, the partition Πmi is non-trivial, i.e., Πmi = {Hmi }. For
every moment mi ∈ h, we have a transition 〈mi H〉 with h ∈ H that is irreducible
to a pair of moments.
Rather than focusing on single transitions, we consider whole sets of transitions,
which allows for even more generality. A set of transitions can be said to be modally
consistent if there is at least one possible course of events that is admitted by all the
transitions in the set. In other words, a consistent set of transitions is such that it allows
at least one history to occur but may exclude others. The set of histories allowed by a
set of transitions T , H(T ), is the intersection of the outcomes of those transitions.
Definition 6 (The set of histories allowed by T ) Given a BT structure M = 〈M,<〉
and a transition set T ⊆ trans(M ), the set of histories allowed by T , in symbols:
H(T ), is given by H(T ) = ⋂〈mH〉∈T H .
We can now define a set of transitions T to be consistent iff the set H(T ) of histories
allowed by T is non-empty.
Definition 7 (Consistency) For M = 〈M,<〉 a BT structure, a transition set
T ⊆ trans(M ) is consistent iff H(T ) = ∅.
Consistency of a transition set comes down to the requirement that all transitions in
the set have to lie within one chain. A consistent set of transitions can in particu-
lar not contain two different transitions with the same initial. Given a BT structure
M = 〈M,<〉, we can define a strict partial ordering on the set of transitions trans(M )
in terms of an inclusion relation on the outcomes. A transition 〈mH〉 ∈ trans(M )
precedes a transition 〈m′ H ′〉 ∈ trans(M ) iff the outcome of 〈m′ H ′〉 is properly
included in the outcome of 〈mH〉.
6 Instead of restricting the definition of a transition 〈mH〉 to the case in which the initialm is a branching
point, we could provide a more general definition of a transition by defining a transition for any arbitrary
moment m ∈ M . The restriction we use is semantically motivated: if Πm = {Hm }, the transition 〈mH〉
does not exclude any history when it is part of a transition set, and we do not allow for a difference in truth
value without change in the set of admitted histories as triggered by a branching point. If M = 〈M, <〉 is a
linear BT structure, which does not contain a branching point, the set trans(M ) is the empty transition set,
denoted by ∅Tr .
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Definition 8 (Transition ordering) Given a BT structure M = 〈M,<〉 and transitions
〈m  H〉, 〈m′  H ′〉 ∈ trans(M ), we say that 〈m  H〉 precedes 〈m′  H ′〉, in
symbols: 〈mH〉 ≺ 〈m′ H ′〉, iff H ′  H .
Note that for 〈m  H〉, 〈m′  H ′〉 ∈ trans(M ), we have H ′  H if and only if
both m < m′ and H ∩ H ′ = ∅. Just as the temporal earlier-later relation < on M , the
transition ordering ≺ on trans(M ) is left-linear. We can prove that a set of transitions
T ⊆ trans(M ) is consistent if and only if all transitions in the set are linearly ordered
via ≺.
Proposition 1 ForM = 〈M,<〉aBT structure and T ⊆ trans(M )a set of transitions,
we have that
H(T ) = ∅ iff T is linearly ordered via ≺ .
Proof “⇒”: Assume that H(T ) = ∅. Then there is some history h ∈ H(T ), and
we have that {m ∈ M | 〈m  H〉 ∈ T } ⊆ h. By Definition 2 it follows that
{m ∈ M | 〈m  H〉 ∈ T } is linearly ordered via the relation <. Let 〈m′  H ′〉,
〈m′′  H ′′〉 ∈ T . Then m′,m′′ ∈ {m ∈ M | 〈m  H〉 ∈ T }. Three cases can be
considered: (i) ifm′ = m′′, then H ′ = H ′′, since otherwiseH(T ) = ∅; (ii) ifm′ < m′′,
then H ′′ = [h]m′′  [h]m′ = H ′, which implies 〈m′  H ′〉 ≺ 〈m′′  H ′′〉; (iii) if
m′′ < m′, then H ′ = [h]m′  [h]m′′ = H ′′ and thus 〈m′′ H ′′〉 ≺ 〈m′ H ′〉.
“⇐”: Assume that T is linearly ordered via ≺. If T contains a maximal element
〈mH〉, then by Definition 8 we have that H ⊆ H(T ) and thus H(T ) = ∅. Assume
that T does not contain a maximal element. Since T is linearly ordered via ≺, it
follows by Definition 8 that {H ⊆ hist(M ) | 〈m  H〉 ∈ T } is linearly ordered via
proper set inclusion , which in turn implies that the set {m ∈ M | 〈m  H〉 ∈ T }
is linearly ordered via <. Hence, by the Axiom of Choice, there is some history
h ⊇ {m ∈ M | 〈m  H〉 ∈ T }. Assume for reductio that h /∈ H(T ). Then there
must be some transition 〈m′  H ′〉 ∈ T such that h /∈ H ′. Since by assumption T
does not contain a maximal element, there is some transition 〈m′′  H ′′〉 ∈ T such
that 〈m′  H ′〉 ≺ 〈m′′  H ′′〉. This implies that H ′′  H ′ and hence m′ < m′′,
from which it follows that Hm′′ ⊆ H ′ = [h′]m′ for some h′ ∈ H ′′  Hm′′ . Since
m′′ ∈ {m ∈ M | 〈mH〉 ∈ T } ⊆ h, we have that h ∈ Hm′′ ⊆ H ′, which contradicts
our assumption that h /∈ H ′. unionsq
With the ordering relation ≺ on trans(M ) at hand, we can close a set of transitions
T ⊆ trans(M ) downwards. A set of transitions T is said to be downward closed if it
contains all transitions preceding any transition occurring in it as well. We call the set
that results from closing a given transition set T downwards the downward completion
of T .
Definition 9 (Downward closed) For M = 〈M,<〉 a BT structure, a transition set
T ⊆ trans(M ) is downward closed iff for all t, t ′ ∈ trans(M ), if t ∈ T and t ′ ≺ t ,
then t ′ ∈ T .
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Definition 10 (Downward completion) For M = 〈M,<〉 a BT structure and
T ⊆ trans(M ) a set of transitions, the downward completion of T , in symbols:
dc(T ), is defined as follows:
dc(T ) = {t ∈ trans(M ) | there is some t ′ ∈ T s.t. t = t ′ or t ≺ t ′}.
Due to the absence of backward branching, the downward completion dc(T ) of a
transition set T is uniquely determined. Moreover, the set of histories allowed by the
downward completion dc(T ) of a transition set T is identical to the set of histories
allowed by the set T itself, i.e.,H(T ) = H(dc(T )). Closing a transition set downward
does not exclude any histories. From this it follows immediately that the downward
completion dc(T ) of a transition set T is consistent if and only if T is consistent.7
By Proposition 1, a consistent, downward closed transition set T is a ≺-chain of
transitions that is closed toward the past. Unlike a history, which is a maximal <-
chain in M and as such represents a complete possible course of events, a consistent,
downward closed transition set is a possibly non-maximal ≺-chain in trans(M ). As
a possibly non-maximal ≺-linear set of transitions that is complete with respect to
the past, a consistent, downward closed transition set uniquely captures a complete
or incomplete possible course of events that stretches linearly from the past toward a
possibly open future. Different consistent, downward closed sets of transitions corre-
spond to different courses of events. The downward completion reflects the idea that
the past is fixed and ensures that every possible consistent extension of a given transi-
tion set is a future extension. In case a consistent, downward closed set of transitions is
a non-maximal≺-chain in trans(M ), it allows more than one history, and the possible
course of events it represents is an incomplete one, viz. one that allows for alterna-
tive possible future continuations. Formally, every consistent, downward closed set of
transitions T in a BT structure M = 〈M,<〉 corresponds one-to-one to a subtree of
M with domain
⋃
H(T ), which comprises at least one history from hist(M ) and is
such that if it contains a branching point, it contains all moments m ∈ M above that
branching point as well. It should also be noted that a consistent, downward closed set
of transitions does not have to contain a greatest element, i.e., not every consistent,
downward closed set of transitions is identical to the downward completion of the
singleton of a particular transition.
Given a BT structure M = 〈M,<〉, we can define for any moment m ∈ M some
downward closed transition set that contains all transitions in the past ofm. Form ∈ M ,
the set of transitions preceding m, Tr(m), is the set of all transitions whose outcome
includes the setHm of histories containingm. Obviously,Tr(m) is consistent, according
7 With the notion of the downward completion dc(T ) of a transition set T at our disposal, we can spell
out in terms of transitions only what it means for a transition set to be consistent, without referring to the
set H(T ) of histories allowed by the transition set T . From Proposition 1 it immediately follows that a
consistent set of transitions cannot contain two different transitions with the same initial since those would
not be order related via ≺. When applied to the downward completion dc(T ) of a transition set T , that
condition is even sufficient for the consistency of T . In other words, a set of transitions T is consistent if and
only if its downward completion dc(T ) does not contain two transitions with the same initial. In the case
of branching time, the two notions of consistency coincide, while they come apart in the case of branching
space-time, as put forth in Belnap (1992), due to what is called modal correlations or ‘funny business’ (see
Müller et al. (2008) and Müller (2014)).
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to Definition 7. The set Tr(m) captures the past course of events up to the moment
m, and we have that H(Tr(m)) = Hm . Note also that for 〈m′  H ′〉 ∈ trans(M ),
Hm ⊆ H ′ implies that m′ < m.
Definition 11 (The set of transitions preceding m) Given a BT structure M = 〈M,<〉
and amomentm ∈ M , the set of transitions preceding m, in symbols:Tr(m), is defined
as follows:
Tr(m) = {〈m′ H ′〉 ∈ trans(M ) | Hm ⊆ H ′}.
A set of transitions T ⊆ trans(M ) ismaximal consistent if it is consistent, but none
of its proper supersets T ′  T in trans(M ) is. By Proposition 1, a maximal consistent
transition set is amaximal≺-chain in trans(M ). The notion of amaximal consistent set
of transitions provides the analogue to the notion of a history. While consistent sets of
transitions can in general also capture incomplete courses of events, which correspond
to non-singleton sets of histories, a maximal consistent set of transitions specifies
exactly one history and thus describes a unique complete possible course of events.
For any history h ∈ hist(M ), we can define the set of transitions characterizing the
history h, Tr(h), as the subset of trans(M ) that contains all and only those transitions
that allow h to occur.
Definition 12 (The set of transitions characterizing h) Given a BT structure
M = 〈M,<〉 and a history h ∈ hist(M ), the set of transitions characterizing h,
in symbols: Tr(h), is defined as follows:
Tr(h) = {〈mH〉 ∈ trans(M ) | h ∈ H}.
By Definition 7 it immediately follows that Tr(h) is consistent since h ∈ H(Tr(h)).
The set Tr(h) is even maximal consistent and thus, in particular, downward closed.
Proposition 2 Let M = 〈M,<〉 be a BT structure and h ∈ hist(M ) a history. The set
Tr(h) of transitions characterizing the history h is maximal consistent.
Proof Obviously, Tr(h) is consistent, since h ∈ H(Tr(h)). We show that Tr(h) is
maximal consistent. Let 〈m H〉 ∈ trans(M ) be a transition s.t. 〈m H〉 /∈ Tr(h),
i.e., h /∈ H . Then there is some history h′ ∈ H s.t. h ≡m h′. By Definitions 1
and 4 it follows that there is some moment m′ ∈ M s.t. m′ ≤ m and h ⊥m′ h′. Since
H = [h′]m ⊆[h′]m′ and 〈m′  [h]m′ 〉∈Tr(h), we have thatH(Tr(h)∪{〈mH〉})=∅.
unionsq
In fact, every maximal consistent transition set T allows exactly one history
h ∈ hist(M ), i.e., H(T ) = {h}, and is identical to a set of transitions Tr(h).
Proposition 3 Let M = 〈M,<〉 be a BT structure and T ⊆ trans(M ) a maximal
consistent set of transitions. Then there is some history h ∈ hist(M ) s.t. (i)H(T ) = {h}
and (ii) T = Tr(h).
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Proof (i) Since by assumption H(T ) = ∅, there is at least one history h ∈ H(T ).
Assume for reductio that there is another history h′ = h s.t. H(T ) ⊇ {h, h′}.
By Definitions 1 and 4 it follows that there is some moment m ∈ M s.t.
h ⊥m h′ and thus Πm ⊇ {[h]m, [h′]m}. We show that 〈m  [h]m〉 /∈ T , but
H(T ∪ {〈m [h]m〉}) = ∅. Assume that 〈m [h]m〉 ∈ T . Then H(T ) ⊆ [h]m .
Since h′ /∈ [h]m , it follows that h′ /∈ H(T ), which contradicts our assumption
that H(T ) ⊇ {h, h′}. Therefore, 〈m  [h]m〉 /∈ T . Since h ∈ H(T ) ∩ [h]m , it
nevertheless holds thatH(T ∪{〈m [h]m〉}) = ∅. This contradicts the maximal
consistency of T .
(ii) By (i), H(T ) = {h}. Thus, T ⊆ Tr(h). We show that Tr(h) ⊆ T . Assume for
reductio that there is some transition 〈m  H〉 ∈ Tr(h) but 〈m  H〉 /∈ T . It
follows that h ∈ H(T ) ∩ H and thus H(T ∪ {〈m H〉}) = ∅. This contradicts
the maximal consistency of T . unionsq
There is thus a natural one-to-one correspondence between maximal consistent sets of
transitions and histories: every maximal consistent set of transitions T ⊆ trans(M )
allows exactly one history h ∈ hist(M ) and is of the form Tr(h); and for every
history h ∈ hist(M ), there is some maximal consistent set of transitions Tr(h), which
characterizes that history.
3.2 BT Semantics with Sets of Transitions
The transition language Lt extends the propositional language L by the following
operators: a future operatorF and a past operatorP, an operator for inevitability and a
stability operatorS. Asmentioned, the basic idea is to replace themoment-history pairs
employed in theOckhamist semantics by pairs consisting of amoment and a consistent,
downward closed set of transitions. For M = 〈M,<〉 a BT structure, let dcts(M ) be
the set of all consistent, downward closed sets of transitions in M, which includes at
least the empty transition set that is denoted by ∅Tr. That is, the set dcts(M ) contains
for every transition set T ⊆ trans(M ) that is consistent, its downward completion
dc(T ); so dcts(M ) = {dc(T ) | T ⊆ trans(M ) and H(T ) = ∅}. The set dcts(M )
provides the full range of transition sets that will be taken into account in the semantic
evaluation on a BT structure M = 〈M,<〉. Each consistent, downward closed set
of transitions corresponds one-to-one to a complete or incomplete possible course
of events that stretches linearly from the past toward a possibly open future. The
restriction of the semantic evaluation to downward closed transition sets reflects the
idea that the past is fixed and ensures that every possible consistent extension of a
given transition set affects the future and excludes at least one history.8
In order for a pair consisting of amomentm∈M and a consistent, downward closed
set of transitions T ∈dcts(M ) to constitute a suitable index of evaluation, the transition
8 As an anonymous referee has correctly pointed out, there are alternative ways to spell out the semantics
without restricting the semantic evaluation to downward closed sets of transitions, treating instead all
transition sets that allow exactly the same histories and hence specify the very same possible course of
events as equivalent. Yet, generalizing the transition parameter is only possible at the cost of increasing the
complexity of the semantic clauses and/or complicating reasoning about possible future extensions. In the
absence of backward branching, closing transition sets downward seems to be the most natural choice.
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set T must allow at least one history that contains themoment of evaluationm∈M , i.e.,
H(T )∩Hm = ∅. In other words, the moment of evaluationm∈M must be compatible
with the transition set T ∈dcts(M ). In analogy with the Ockhamist case, we employ
the notation “m/T ” in order to indicate that the condition is met. We now provide the
semantic clauses for the temporal operatorsF andP, the inevitability operator and the
stability operator S. We use M,m/T t φ in order to indicate that a sentence φ∈Lt
is true at a pair m/T in a transition model M=〈M, vt〉 on a BT structure M=〈M,<〉
with vt : At×{m/T | m∈M , T ∈dcts(M ) and H(T )∩Hm = ∅} → {0, 1} according
to the transition semantics.9
3.2.1 Temporal Operators
In the case of the temporal operators F and P, the transition set T ∈ dcts(M ) is kept
fixed, and the moment of evaluation m ∈ M is shifted in a way compatible with that
transition set. As said, the crucial point in developing a propositional semantics on aBT
structure consists in spelling out appropriate truth conditions for the future operator.
The future operator F of the transition semantics has both Peircean and Ockhamist
traits: it combines the idea of universally quantifying over future possibilities with
the Ockhamist idea of relativizing truth to a possible course of events. Unlike in
Ockhamism, the possible course of events needs not to be a complete one, however;
and whereas the Peircean future operator requires a witness in every possible future
continuation of the moment of evaluation, our future operator demands a witness in
only those future continuations of themoment of evaluation that are possible extensions
of the given transition set. Along those lines, we can say that a sentence of the form
Fφ is true at an index m/T iff for every extension T ′ ⊇ T that is compatible with the
moment of evaluation m, there is a compatible future moment m′ > m at which φ is
true with respect to the original transition set.
(F) M,m/T t Fφ iff for all T ′ ⊇ T s.t.H(T ′)∩ Hm = ∅, there is some m′ > m
s.t. H(T ′) ∩ Hm′ = ∅ and M,m′/T t φ.
Note that the sole function of the universal quantification over the possible future
extensions T ′ of the given transition set T is to specify the range of possible future
continuations of m that are required to contain a witness for the future claim. The
semantic clause (F) is equivalent to the following condition, in which the universal
quantification over future possibilities is spelled out by reference to the set of histories
allowed by the given transition set rather than in terms of its possible future extensions:
(F) M,m/T t Fφ iff for all h ∈ H(T )∩Hm , there is some m′ ∈ h s.t. m′ > m and
M,m′/T t φ.10
Obviously, (F) implies (F): if for every T ′ ⊇ T s.t.H(T ′)∩Hm = ∅, there is a future
witnessm′ > m s.t.H(T ′)∩Hm′ = ∅, then this holds, in particular, for every maximal
consistent extension T ′ of T . Since by Proposition 2 for every h ∈ H(T ) ∩ Hm , there
9 In Sect. 4.1 we generalize the definition of a transition model by invoking the notion of a transition
structure.
10 This is the semantic clause for the future operator provided in Müller (2014).
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is a maximal consistent extension Tr(h)  T with H(Tr(h)) = {h}, condition (F)
implies the existence of a future witness m′ > m in every history h ∈ H(T )∩Hm . On
the other hand, let T ′ ⊇ T be an extension of T s.t. H(T ′) ∩ Hm = ∅. Given that (F)
holds, for every h ∈ H(T ′)∩Hm ⊆ H(T )∩Hm , there is some future witness m′ > m
in h so thatH(T ′)∩Hm′ = ∅. Since (F) is equivalent with (F) and easier to grasp, we
will make use of (F) in what follows. We will thus say that a sentence of the form Fφ
is true at an index of evaluation m/T if and only if every history that passes through
the moment m and is admitted by T contains some later moment m′ at which φ is true
with respect to T .11
The semantic clause for the past operator P is straightforward: a sentence of the
form Pφ is true at an index of evaluation m/T if and only if there is some earlier
moment m′ < m such that φ is true at m′ with respect to T . Due to the absence of
backward branching, every moment has a unique past, and given that the moment of
evaluation is compatible with the given transition set, all moments in its past are so as
well, so that no further specification is needed in that case.
(P) M,m/T t Pφ iff there is some m′ < m s.t. M,m′/T t φ.
3.2.2 Modal Operators
Since—like in Ockhamism but unlike in Peirceanism—the semantic evaluation is rel-
ativized to a second parameter of truth, which specifies some possible course of events,
modal operators are interpretable, and truth and inevitability come apart. In the case
of the modal operators, the moment of evaluation m ∈ M is kept constant, and the
modalities are interpreted as quantifiers over all transition sets T ∈ dcts(M ) that are
compatible with that moment m. The inevitability operator  amounts to universal
quantification. A modal operator for possibility, ♦, can be defined as its dual, i.e.,
♦ := ¬¬. As in standard Ockhamism, the modality involved is S5. The truth
of a sentence of the form φ with respect to some index of evaluation m/T can
be understood along the following lines: relative to any—complete or incomplete—
possible course of events compatible with m, φ is true at m. Note that, unlike in
Ockhamism, an incomplete possible course of events suffices as a witness for a pos-
sibility claim.
() M,m/T t φ iff for all T ′ ∈ dcts(M ) s.t. H(T ′) ∩ Hm = ∅, M,m/T ′ t φ.
3.2.3 Stability Operators
Evaluating sentences with respect to consistent, downward closed sets of transitions
rather than with respect to entire histories brings in a new phenomenon that is specific
to the transition approach. The truth value of a sentence at a moment can change if the
transition set is extended so that it stretches further into the future. Next to temporal
and modal operators, the transition semantics allows for a stability operator, S, which
11 In addition to the strong future operatorF, which universally quantifies over future possibilities, we could
also introduce a weak future operator f into our language, which is interpreted as an existential quantifier
over future possibilities. For simplicity’s sake, we omit the operator f in the present paper.
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is interpreted as a universal quantifier over the possible extensions of a given transition
set that are compatible with themoment of evaluation. The stability operatorS enables
us to specify how and how far time has to unfold for the truth value of a sentence at
a moment to become settled, or stable, as we will say. The dual Sof the stability
operator, an existential quantifier over the possible extensions of a transition set, can
be defined as follows: S:= ¬S¬. The modality involved is S4. A sentence of the
form Sφ is true at an index of evaluation m/T iff φ is true at m with respect to any
possible extension T ′ of T that is compatible withm. Given thatSφ is true with respect
to m/T , whatever else will happen, i.e. no matter how we extend the transition set T ,
φ remains true at m.
(S) M,m/T t Sφ iff for all T ′ ⊇ T s.t. H(T ′) ∩ Hm = ∅,M,m/T ′ t φ.
If in a transition model M, the sentence Sφ is true at an index of evaluation m/T ,
i.e., M,m/T t Sφ, we say that φ is stably-true relative to that index. Accordingly,
we say that φ is stably-false relative to an index of evaluation m/T if its negation ¬φ
is stably-true at that index, i.e., M,m/T t S¬φ.
There are sentences that classify as neither stably-true nor stably-false with respect
to a given index of evaluation m/T : those sentences are said to be contingent rel-
ative to m/T . They are true at the moment m with respect to one extension of T
that is compatible with m but false with respect to another. In other words, a sen-
tence φ is contingent relative to m/T if and only if Sφ ∧ S¬φ is true at m/T , i.e.,
M,m/T t Sφ ∧ S¬φ or, equivalently, M,m/T t ¬Sφ ∧ ¬S¬φ.
A sentence φ that is contingent relative to some index of evaluation m/T can
become stably-true or stably-false with respect to some extension T ′ of the transition
set T . Once the truth value of the sentence φ has become stable with respect to some
index, however, it remains stable under all extensions of the transition set in question.
In particular, a sentence that is stably-true with respect to some index m/T remains
stably-true at m relative to all extensions T ′ ⊇ T compatible with m.
The domain of quantification of the stability operator S is only a subset of the
domain of quantification of the inevitability operator . Whereas the inevitability
operator quantifies over all transition sets compatible with the moment of evaluation,
the stability operator quantifies over only the possible future extensions of the given
transition set. Inevitability implies stability, but not vice versa. That the truth of a
sentence φ is inevitable at an index m/T means that the sentence φ is true at the
moment m no matter what happens. That a sentence φ is stably-true relative to an
index m/T , on the other hand, expresses that given the course of events specified by
the transition set T , it is settled that φ is true at the moment m: with respect to that
course of events, the sentence φ is true at the moment m no matter what will happen
later on. As a universal quantifier over the possible future extensions of a given course
of events, the stability operator allows for a perspicuous treatment of sentences about
the future whose truth value at a moment only stabilizes as the future unfolds. It
enables us to capture the behavior of the truth value of a sentence about the future at
a moment in the course of time, viz. its changing from contingent to stably-true or
stably-false. We will come back to the role of the stability operator in the context of
future contingents in Sect. 4.4 below.
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3.3 Sentences About the Future in the Transition Semantics
In the transition semantics, sentences are evaluated at a moment with respect
to a possible course of events compatible with that moment, just as in Ock-
hamism. The crucial difference between the transition semantics and Ockhamism
consists in the fact that whereas the histories employed in the Ockhamist seman-
tics represent complete possible courses of events, the transition semantics allows
for the relativization to incomplete possible courses of events as well. In order
to illustrate what that difference amounts to, let us have a look at how sen-
tences about the future are treated in the transition semantics. For that purpose,
consider a model M = 〈M, vt〉 on a BT structure M = 〈M,<〉 that con-
tains a branching point m such that there is one possible future continuation of
m in which p always is the case and another in which p never is the case,
where the truth value of p is only moment-dependent. That is, in the model in
Fig. 1, we assume that for all T s.t. H(T ) ∩ Hm = ∅, vt(p,m′/T ) = 1 if
m′ > m and m′ ∈ h2 ∪ h3, and vt(p,m′/T ) = 0 if m′ > m and m′ ∈ h4. We
will now investigate the behavior of the truth value of the sentence Fp and its contrary










































Fig. 1 Evaluation w.r.t. different transition sets
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Let us start with the empty transition set, ∅Tr, which excludes none of the histories
passing through the moment m, since H(∅Tr) = hist(M ). If we evaluate the sentences
Fp and F¬p at the index m/∅Tr, both sentences turn out false, i.e., M,m/∅Tr t Fp
and M,m/∅Tr t F¬p. The sentence Fp is false at m/∅Tr since the empty transition
set ∅Tr admits the history h4 ∈ Hm , in which p is false at any moment later thanm; and
F¬p is equally false atm/∅Tr since the empty transition set ∅Tr also allows the history
h2 ∈ Hm , in which p holds at any moment later thanm. The same is true if we evaluate
the sentences at themomentm with respect to the set of transitions precedingm,Tr(m),
as H(∅Tr)∩Hm = H(Tr(m))∩Hm although h1 ∈ H(∅Tr) \H(Tr(m)). Again, both the
sentence Fp and its contrary prediction F¬p turn out false at the index m/Tr(m), i.e.,
M,m/Tr(m) t Fp and M,m/Tr(m) t F¬p. With both the sentences Fp and F¬p
being false at m/∅ and m/Tr(m), respectively, their disjunction Fp∨F¬p is likewise
false at those indices, i.e., M,m/∅Tr t Fp ∨ F¬p and M,m/Tr(m) t Fp ∨ F¬p.
Yet, the disjunction is false at those indices only contingently, as we shall see.
With respect to the transition set T1, which specifies the immediate possible future
continuation of m in which p always is the case, the sentence Fp is true at the
moment m, while its contrary prediction is false at that index, i.e., M,m/T1 t Fp
and M,m/T1 t F¬p. The transition set T1 excludes any history in Hm that lacks a
witness for the future claim Fp. With respect to the transition set T2, on the other hand,
which captures the immediate possible future continuation of m in which p never is
the case, F¬p is true at m, while Fp is false at that index, i.e., M,m/T2 t F¬p
and M,m/T2 t Fp. Since there is a transition set compatible with m with respect
to which Fp is true and F¬p is false at m and another with respect to which F¬p is
true and Fp is false at m, each of the possibility claims ♦Fp, ♦¬F¬p, ♦F¬p and
♦¬Fp is true at the moment m with respect to any transition set compatible with that
moment. In particular, we have that at the index m/T1 both Fp and ♦¬Fp are true,
i.e., M,m/T1 t Fp ∧ ♦¬Fp, which shows that future truth and inevitability come
apart, as they should. Note that Fp is obviously also true at m with respect to the
transition set Tr(h2), which is maximal consistent and characterizes the history h2.
Since we have M,m/Tr(h2) t Fp, the transition set Tr(h2) constitutes a witness for
the possibility claim ♦Fp at the moment m, just as the transition set T1 does. Yet in
contrast to Tr(h2), the transition set T1 provides a local witness for that possibility:
the possibility Fp arises at the branching point m, even though the relevant element
of the partition contains more than one history.
Since both T1 and T2 are extensions of the transition set Tr(m), with Fp being true
at m/T1 and false at m/T2, we have that SFp∧ S¬Fp is true at m with respect to the
set Tr(m) of transitions preceding that moment, i.e., M,m/Tr(m) t SFp ∧ S¬Fp
or, equivalently, M,m/Tr(m) t ¬SFp ∧ ¬S¬Fp. The sentence Fp is contingent
with respect tom/Tr(m): it is neither stably-true nor stably-false relative to that index.
With respect to the transition set T1, and likewise T2, however, the sentence Fp is
not contingent anymore at the moment m. Its truth value at the moment m stabilizes
with respect to any possible extension of Tr(m): the sentence Fp is stably-true with
respect to m/T1 and stably-false with respect to m/T2, i.e., M,m/T1 t SFp and
M,m/T2 t S¬Fp. The sentence Fp is true at the index m/T1 and remains true at
m with respect to every proper extension of T1, such as Tr(h2). Being stably-true at
m with respect to T1, Fp is also stably-true at m with respect to Tr(h2)  T1, i.e.,
123
Transition Semantics for Branching Time 95
M,m/Tr(h2) t SFp. Neither at m/T1 nor at m/Tr(h2) is it inevitable, however,
that Fp. The sentence Fp is false at both those indices, i.e., M,m/T1 t Fp and
M,m/Tr(h2) t Fp, since M,m/T2 t Fp. A sentence can be stably-true relative
to an index of evaluation without its truth at that index being inevitable.
We said that the sentence Fp is contingent at the moment m with respect to the set
Tr(m) of transitions preceding that moment. Accordingly, it is also contingent at m
with respect to any proper subset of Tr(m), such as the empty transition set ∅Tr. Its
truth value at the moment m depends on how the future unfolds and stabilizes only as
time progresses. The same is true for F¬p and hence for the disjunction Fp ∨ F¬p.
At the moment m, we have M,m/Tr(m) t S(Fp ∨ F¬p) ∧ S¬(Fp ∨ F¬p), since
M,m/T1 t Fp∨F¬p and M,m/T2 t Fp∨F¬p but M,m/Tr(m) t Fp∨F¬p.
That the disjunction is false at the moment m with respect to Tr(m) is a sign
of contingency: the course of events up to m does not yet suffice to settle the
matter. Only as the future unfolds, the truth value of either disjunct eventually
stabilizes—in a maximal consistent extension, if not before—rendering the disjunc-
tion stably-true at the moment m as well. We have M,m/T1 t S(Fp ∨ F¬p) and
M,m/T2 t S(Fp∨F¬p). The intuition that the disjunction Fp∨F¬p has the force
of a tautology, as expressed by Thomason (1970), is reflected in the transition seman-
tics by the validity ¬S¬(Fp ∨ F¬p) or, equivalently S(Fp ∨ F¬p). The disjunction
is never stably-false. As time progresses, sooner or later, things will become settled
one way or the other.
4 The Generality of the Transition Semantics
Every BT structure M = 〈M,<〉 provides a set of moments M , a set of histories
hist(M ) and a set of transitions trans(M ). Peirceanism, Ockhamism and the transition
account differ with respect to which of those structural elements are employed as
parameters of truth in the semantic evaluation. In this sectionwe show that the transition
semantics generalizes and properly extends both Peirceanism and Ockhamism. Being
based on sets of transitions, the transition semantics exploits the full resources a
BT structure has to offer. It thereby gains expressive means that are not available
on either of those accounts, which are shown to make use of restricted means only.
Zanardo (1998) likewise provides a framework that generalizes both Peirceanism and
Ockhamism. We will discuss that framework in Sect. 4.4 below and illustrate to what
extent the transition semantics with its stability operator exceeds also that account
with respect to expressive strength.
In the transition semantics as outlined in Sect. 3.2, the parameters of truth employed
in the semantic evaluation are provided by pairs consisting of a moment and a consis-
tent, downward closed set of transitions. A sentence φ ∈ Lt is assigned a truth value
in a model M = 〈M, vt〉 on a BT structure M = 〈M,<〉 at a moment m ∈ M with
respect to a transition set T ∈ dcts(M ) such that H(T )∩Hm = ∅. A set of transitions
T ∈ dcts(M ) allows certain histories h ∈ hist(M ) to occur and excludes others. There
are two extreme cases. If T ∈ dcts(M ) is the empty transition set, i.e., T = ∅Tr, it
excludes no histories whatsoever. The set of histories allowed by the empty transition
set ∅Tr is the set of all histories in M, i.e., H(∅Tr) = hist(M ). If, on the other hand,
T ∈ dcts(M ) is a maximal consistent transition set, it excludes all but one history.
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By Proposition 3, every maximal consistent set of transitions is identical to a set Tr(h)
that characterizes exactly one history h ∈ hist(M ) and allows only that history to
occur, i.e., H(Tr(h)) = {h}. We show that if only the empty transition set ∅Tr is taken
into account in the semantic evaluation on a BT structure, we are back to Peirceanism,
while a restriction to all maximal consistent transition sets yields Ockhamism.
4.1 Transition Structures
In order to be able to capture the restriction of the semantic evaluation on aBT structure
M = 〈M,<〉 to subsets of dcts(M ) in a uniform way, we generalize the notion of
a transition model by introducing the notion of a transition structure. A transition
structure M ts = 〈M,<, ts〉 is a BT structure M = 〈M,<〉 together with a non-empty
set of transition sets ts ⊆ dcts(M ) such that every momentm ∈ M is compatible with
at least one transition set T ∈ ts. The set ts of transition sets is required to be such
that it covers the entire set of moments, which figure as the fundamental elements
of a BT structure.12 Note that the set ts does not really ‘add’ anything to the BT
structure: the BT structure itself already determines all possible sets of transitions in
dcts(M ). The set tsmerely indicates which of those transition sets are employed in the
semantic evaluation. We define a transition model as a pair Mts = 〈M ts, vt〉, where
M ts = 〈M,<, ts〉 is a transition structure and vt a valuation function that assigns truth
values to the propositional variables of Lt at a moment m ∈ M relative to a transition
set T ∈ ts s.t. H(T ) ∩ Hm = ∅.
Definition 13 (Transition structure) A transition structure is a triple
M ts= 〈M,<, ts〉, where M = 〈M,<〉 is a BT structure and ts ⊆ dcts(M ) a non-
empty set of transition sets such that for every moment m ∈ M , there is some
T ∈ ts such that H(T ) ∩ Hm = ∅.
Definition 14 (Transition model) A transition model Mts = 〈M ts, vt〉 is a
transition structure M ts = 〈M,<, ts〉 together with a valuation function
vt : At × {m/T | m ∈ M , T ∈ ts and H(T ) ∩ Hm = ∅} → {0, 1}.
The following semantic clauses extend the valuation vt on the propositional vari-
ables p ∈ At in a transition model Mts = 〈M ts, vt〉 on a transition structure
M ts = 〈M,<, ts〉 to all sentences φ ∈ Lt. As usual, we use Mts,m/T t φ in
order to indicate that a sentence φ ∈ Lt is true in a transition model Mts at a moment
m ∈ M with respect to a transition set T ∈ ts. The expressionsMts t φ for validity in
a transition model, M ts t φ for validity in a transition structure and t φ for general
validity are defined in the obvious way.
12 The notion of a transition structure is the analogue of the definition of a bundled tree (see Defini-
tion 17): a transition structure comprises a set ts of primitive transition sets, while a bundled tree comprises
a set of primitive histories. In both cases, it is required that the respective ‘bundle’ spans the entire
structure. As pointed out by an anonymous referee, rather than requiring every moment m ∈ M to be
compatible with some transition set in ts, we could alternatively require every history h ∈ hist(M ) to
be allowed by some such set, which would rule out incomplete Ockhamist transition structures with
ts  {Tr(h) ∈ dcts(M ) | h ∈ hist(M )} from the outset (cf. Sect. 4.3). Our reason for preferring the
more general definition over the stronger alternative is that BT structures are defined in terms of moments
rather than in terms of histories. Histories are defined elements in a BT structure.
123
Transition Semantics for Branching Time 97
(At) Mts,m/T t p iff vt(p,m/T ) = 1;
(¬) Mts,m/T t ¬φ iff Mts,m/T t φ;
(∧) Mts,m/T t φ ∧ ψ iff Mts,m/T t φ and Mts,m/T t ψ ;
(F) Mts,m/T t Fφ iff for all h ∈ H(T ) ∩ Hm, there is some m′ ∈ h s.t. m′ > m
and Mts,m′/T t φ;
(P) Mts,m/T t Pφ iff there is some m′ < m s.t. Mts,m′/T t φ;
() Mts,m/T t φ iff for all T ′ ∈ ts s.t. H(T ′) ∩ Hm = ∅, Mts,m/T ′ t φ;
(S) Mts,m/T t Sφ iff for all T ′ ∈ ts s.t. T ′ ⊇ T and H(T ′) ∩ Hm = ∅,
Mts,m/T ′ t φ.
In a transition model Mts = 〈M ts, vt〉, the inevitability operator  and the stability
operator S, as well as their duals ♦ := ¬¬ and S:= ¬S¬, quantify over transition
sets in ts only. The semantic clauses for the future operator F and the past operator P
remain intact, as they do not involve a shift of the transition parameter. In the case of
the future operator, we make use of the formulation in which the quantification over
future possibilities is spelled out in terms of the set of histories admitted by the given
transition set—rather than in terms of its possible future extensions. In Sect. 3.2, we
focused on models on transition structures M dcts(M ) = 〈M,<,dcts(M )〉, and the
semantic clauses were formulated for only that class of models. Transition models
on a structure M dcts(M ) make use of the entire range of consistent, downward closed
sets of transitions the BT structure M has to offer, while all other transition models
rest upon limited resources only. With the general notion of a transition model at our
disposal, let us now consider how Peirceanism andOckhamism can be captured within
the transition approach.
4.2 Generalizing Peirceanism
Let us have a look at the Peircean account first. On the Peircean account, the semantic
evaluation is relativized to a moment parameter only: sentences φ ∈ Lp are assigned
truth values in a Peircean model M = 〈M, vp〉 on a BT structure M = 〈M,<〉 relative
to a moment m ∈ M . The clause for the future operator Fp universally quantifies
over all histories containing the moment of evaluation, demanding a future witness
in every single one of them. We can capture Peirceanism with its sole dependence on
the moment of evaluation m in the transition framework by restricting the semantic
evaluation on a BT structure M = 〈M,<〉 to the empty transition set ∅Tr. In other
words, we consider models on a transition structure M {∅Tr} = 〈M,<, {∅Tr}〉. Due
to the restriction to the empty transition set ∅Tr, the possible indices of evaluation
are restricted to pairs m/∅Tr consisting of a moment m ∈ M and the empty transi-
tion set ∅Tr, for which it holds that H(∅Tr) ∩ Hm = Hm , since H(∅Tr) = hist(M ).
At any moment of evaluation m ∈ M , all histories containing m are admitted by
the empty transition set ∅Tr, which allows us to mimic the Peircean future operator.
We call a transition structure M {∅Tr} = 〈M,<, {∅Tr}〉 a Peircean transition struc-




Definition 15 (Peircean transition structure and model) A transition structure
M ts = 〈M,<, ts〉 is called a Peircean transition structure iff ts = {∅Tr}. A tran-
sition model M{∅Tr} = 〈M {∅Tr}, vt〉 on a Peircean transition structure M {∅Tr} is called
a Peircean transition model.
There is a natural one-to-one correspondence between Peircean transition struc-
tures M {∅Tr} = 〈M,<, {∅Tr}〉 and BT structures M = 〈M,<〉. We show that for
every Peircean transition model M{∅Tr} = 〈M {∅Tr}, vt〉, there is a Peircean BT model
M = 〈M, vp〉, and vice versa, such that a sentence φ ∈ Lt is true in M{∅Tr} at a pair
m/∅Tr according to the transition semantics if and only if its respective translation
φ∗ ∈ Lp is true in M at the moment m according to the Peircean semantics. For any
sentence φ ∈ Lt, its translation φ∗ into the Peircean language Lp can be defined
recursively, and every sentence of the Peircean language is a translation of some sen-
tence in the transition language. As bothLt andLp are extensions of the propositional
language L , suffice it to say that (Fφ)∗ = Fpφ∗, (Pφ)∗ = Ppφ∗, (φ)∗ = φ∗ and
(Sφ)∗ = φ∗. Note that due to the restriction to a single set of transitions, viz. the
empty transition set ∅Tr, the equivalences p ↔ p and Sp ↔ p are valid in every
Peircean transition structure, in symbols: {∅Tr}t p ↔ p and {∅Tr}t Sp ↔ p.
Proposition 4 Let M {∅Tr} = 〈M,<, {∅Tr}〉 be a Peircean transition structure. The
mapping ξ : 〈M {∅Tr}, vt〉 → 〈M, vp〉 with vt(p,m/∅Tr) = vp(p,m) for all
p ∈ At and m ∈ M is a bijection between Peircean transition models on M {∅Tr} and
Peircean BT models on M . The following holds: given a Peircean transition model
M{∅Tr} = 〈M {∅Tr}, vt〉, for every φ ∈ Lt and every m ∈ M:
M{∅Tr},m/∅Tr t φ iff ξ(M{∅Tr}),m p φ∗.
Proof The proof runs by induction on the structure of a sentence φ ∈ Lt. Given the
correspondence ξ , the base clause is straightforward. The case for P is trivial, and
the cases for  and S dissolve due to the validity of the equivalences p ↔ p and
Sp ↔ p. In the case of the future operator F, the proof makes use of the fact that
H(∅Tr) = hist(M ) and hence H(∅Tr) ∩ Hm = Hm . unionsq
From Proposition 4 it follows that a sentence φ ∈ Lt is valid in a Peircean transition
structure M {∅Tr} if and only if its translation φ∗ is Peircean valid in the corresponding
BT structure M . Since there is a natural one-to-one correspondence between Peircean
transition structures and BT structures, this implies that a sentence φ ∈ Lt is valid
with respect to the class of all Peircean transition structures if and only if its translation
φ∗ is valid in the Peircean semantics.
Corollary 1 For every φ ∈ Lt:
{∅Tr}t φ iff p φ
∗.
Proof Follows from Proposition 4. unionsq
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By Corollary 1, Peircean validity is equivalent to validity with respect to the class of
all Peircean transition structures as every sentence of the Peircean language Lp is a
translation of some sentence in the transition language Lt. We show that the class of
all Peircean transition structures can be characterized in Lt, which then allows us to
define Peircean validity in the transition semantics. More precisely, we prove that a
transition structure M ts is a Peircean transition structure if and only if the equivalence
p ↔ p is valid in M ts.
Proposition 5 For M ts = 〈M,<, ts〉 a transition structure:
ts = {∅Tr} iff M ts t p ↔ p.
Proof “⇒”: Assume that ts = {∅Tr}. As said, we have {∅Tr}t p ↔ p, and hence
M ts t p ↔ p.
“⇐”: Assume that ts = {∅Tr}. Then there are T, T ′ ∈ dcts(M ) s.t. ts ⊇ {T, T ′}.
For, assume that ts = {T } for some T = ∅Tr. Then there is some 〈m  H〉 ∈ T ,
which implies that there is some h ∈ Hm \ H and some m′ ∈ h s.t. H ∩ Hm′ = ∅.
Since H(T ) ⊆ H , it follows that H(T ) ∩ Hm′ = ∅. Hence, for ts = {T } = {∅Tr},
M ts is not a transition structure according to Definition 13. Now take some moment
m ∈ M s.t. H(T )∩Hm = ∅ and H(T ′)∩Hm = ∅. Consider a model Mts = 〈M ts, vt〉
s.t. vt(p,m/T ) = 1 and vt(p,m/T ′) = 0. We then have that Mts,m/T t p but
Mts,m/T t p, since Mts,m/T ′ t p. Consequently, Mts,m/T t p ↔ p, and
hence M ts t p ↔ p. unionsq
As said, by Corollary 1, Peircean validity is equivalent to validity with respect to the
class of all Peircean transition structures, and by the correspondence result established
in Proposition 5, that class can be characterized by the equivalencep ↔ p. Peircean
validity is thus definable in the transition semantics: a sentenceof thePeircean language
is valid in the Peircean semantics if and only if its Lt-correspondent is valid in all
transition structures in which p ↔ p is valid.
Corollary 2 For every φ ∈ Lt:
(for all M ts s.t. M ts t p ↔ p, M ts t φ) iff p φ∗.
Proof Follows from Corollary 1 and Proposition 5. unionsq
4.3 Generalizing Ockhamism
On the Ockhamist account, the semantic evaluation is relativized to a history as a sec-
ond parameter of truth next to the moment parameter: sentences φ ∈ Lt are assigned
truth values in an Ockhamist model M = 〈M, vo〉 on a BT structure M = 〈M,<〉
relative to a moment-history pair m/h, where m ∈ M and h ∈ Hm . The clause
for the future operator Fo simply shifts the moment of evaluation forward on the
given history, just as in linear tense logic. Since, by Propositions 2 and 3, there
is a one-to-one correspondence between histories and maximal consistent transi-
tion sets, we can capture Ockhamism with its dependence on a history parameter
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in the transition semantics by restricting the semantic evaluation to maximal con-
sistent transition sets. For M = 〈M,<〉 a BT structure, let mcts(M ) ⊆ dcts(M )
be the set of all maximal consistent transition sets in M . Since for every history
h ∈ hist(M ), there is a maximal consistent transition set Tr(h), and since every
maximal consistent transition set is identical to some such set Tr(h), we have that
mcts(M ) = {Tr(h) ∈ dcts(M ) | h ∈ hist(M )}. We then consider models on a transi-
tion structure M mcts(M ) = 〈M,<,mcts(M )〉. The restriction to maximal consistent
transition sets ensures that the possible indices of evaluation are restricted to pairs
m/Tr(h) consisting of a moment m ∈ M and a maximal consistent set of transitions
Tr(h) ∈ mcts(M ), for which it holds, by Proposition 3, that H(Tr(h)) = {h}. At
any index of evaluation m/Tr(h), exactly one history containing the moment m is
admitted by the maximal consistent transition set Tr(h), viz. the corresponding his-
tory h, which allows us to mimic the Ockhamist future operator. Note that in a model
on a transition structure M mcts(M ) = 〈M,<,mcts(M )〉, the modal operators like-
wise quantify over maximal consistent transition sets only, which is in accordance
with their interpretation in the Ockhamist semantics. We call a transition struc-
ture M mcts(M ) = 〈M,<,mcts(M )〉 an Ockhamist transition structure and a model
Mmcts(M ) = 〈M mcts(M ), vt〉 on such a structure an Ockhamist transition model.
Definition 16 (Ockhamist transition structure and model) A transition structure
M ts = 〈M,<, ts〉 is called an Ockhamist transition structure iff ts = mcts(M ).
A transition model Mmcts(M ) = 〈M mcts(M ), vt〉 on an Ockhamist transition structure
M mcts(M ) is called an Ockhamist transition model.
There is a natural one-to-one correspondence between Ockhamist transition struc-
tures M mcts(M ) = 〈M,<,mcts(M )〉 and BT structures M = 〈M,<〉. Just
as in the Peircean case, we show that for every Ockhamist transition model
Mmcts(M ) = 〈M mcts(M ), vt〉, there is an Ockhamist BT model M = 〈M, vo〉, and
vice versa, such that a sentence φ ∈ Lt is true in Mmcts(M ) at a pair m/Tr(h) accord-
ing to the transition semantics if and only if its respective translation φ∗ ∈ Lo is true
in M at the corresponding pair m/h according to the Ockhamist semantics. For any
sentence φ ∈ Lt, its translation φ∗ into the Ockhamist language Lo can be defined
recursively, and every sentence of the Ockhamist language is a translation of some sen-
tence in the transition language. As bothLt andLo are extensions of the propositional
language L , suffice it to say that (Fφ)∗ = Foφ∗, (Pφ)∗ = Poφ∗, (φ)∗ = oφ∗
and (Sφ)∗ = φ∗. Note that due to the restriction to maximal consistent transition
sets, which cannot be further extended, the equivalence Sp ↔ p is valid in every
Ockhamist transition structure, in symbols: mctst Sp ↔ p.
Proposition 6 Let M mcts(M ) = 〈M,<,mcts(M )〉 be an Ockhamist transition struc-
ture. The mapping ξ : 〈M mcts(M ), vt〉 → 〈M, vo〉 with vt(p,m/Tr(h)) = vo(p,m/h)
for all p ∈ At, m ∈ M and h ∈ Hm is a bijection between Ockhamist transition
models on M mcts(M ) and Ockhamist BT models on M . The following holds: given
an Ockhamist transition model Mmcts(M ) = 〈M mcts(M ), vt〉, for every φ ∈ Lt, every
m ∈ M and every h ∈ Hm:
Mmcts(M ),m/Tr(h) t φ iff ξ(Mmcts(M )),m/h o φ∗.
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Proof The proof runs by induction on the structure of a sentence φ ∈ Lt. Given the
correspondence ξ , the base clause is straightforward. The case for P is trivial, and
the case for S dissolves due to the validity of the equivalence Sp ↔ p. In the case
of the future operator F and the inevitability operator , the proof makes use of the
fact that mcts(M ) = {Tr(h) ∈ dcts(M ) | h ∈ hist(M )} and H(Tr(h)) = {h} for all
h ∈ hist(M ). unionsq
Due to the one-to-one correspondence between Ockhamist transitionmodels and Ock-
hamist BT models established in Proposition 6, validity with respect to the class of all
Ockhamist transition structures coincides with Ockhamist validity: a sentence φ ∈ Lt
is valid in every Ockhamist transition structure if and only if its translation φ∗ ∈ Lo
is valid in the Ockhamist semantics.
Corollary 3 For every φ ∈ Lt:
mctst φ iff o φ∗.
Proof Follows from Proposition 6. unionsq
Since every sentence of the Ockhamist language Lo is a translation of some sentence
in the transition language Lt, by Corollary 3, Ockhamist validity is equivalent to
validity with respect to the class of all Ockhamist transition structures.
We finally show that the class of all Ockhamist transition structures can be charac-
terized inLt, which allows us to define Ockhamist validity in the transition semantics.
We proceed in two steps: we first prove that the class of all transition structures M ts
in which ts comprises maximal consistent transition sets only, i.e., ts ⊆ mcts(M ), is
definable in Lt. We then single out from that class those transition structures M ts for
which ts = mcts(M ).
We now show in a first step that the class of all transition structures M ts in which
ts does not contain any transition set that is not maximal consistent can be character-
ized in Lt. In particular, we prove that for all transition structures M ts it holds that
ts ⊆ mcts(M ) if and only if the disjunction Fp ∨ F¬p is valid in M ts.
Proposition 7 For M ts = 〈M,<, ts〉 a transition structure:
ts ⊆ mcts(M ) iff M ts t Fp ∨ F¬p.
Proof “⇒”: Let M ts = 〈M,<, ts〉 be a transition structure with ts ⊆ mcts(M ). Let
Mts be a model on M ts, and let m ∈ M and Tr(h) ∈ ts s.t. H(Tr(h)) ∩ Hm = ∅.
Assume that Mts,m/Tr(h) t Fp. By the semantic clause for F, it follows that for
all m′ ∈ M s.t. m′ ∈ h and m′ > m, Mts,m′/Tr(h) t p, which again implies
that Mts,m/Tr(h) t F¬p since, by condition (BT3) of Definition 1, there is no last
moment. Hence, Mts,m/Tr(h) t Fp ∨ F¬p. As Mts, m and Tr(h) were arbitrarily
chosen, it follows that M ts t Fp ∨ F¬p.
“⇐”: Assume that ts  mcts(M ). Then there is some T ∈ ts s.t. T is not maximal
consistent, i.e., there is some transition 〈m  H〉 ∈ trans(M ) s.t. 〈m  H〉 /∈ T
and H(T ∪ {〈m  H〉}) = ∅. This implies that Hm ⊆ H(T ) and that there are
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histories h, h′ ∈ Hm s.t. h ⊥m h′. Consider some transition model Mts = 〈M ts, vt〉
s.t. vt(p,m′/T ) = 1 if m′ > m and m′ ∈ h, and vt(p,m′/T ) = 0 if m′ > m and
m′ ∈ h′. We then have that Mts,m/T t Fp and Mts,m/T t F¬p. Consequently,
Mts,m/T t Fp ∨ F¬p, and hence M ts t Fp ∨ F¬p. unionsq
Now consider the class of all transition structures M ts with ts ⊆ mcts(M ). If
ts = mcts(M ) = {Tr(h) ∈ dcts(M ) | h ∈ hist(M )}, then M ts is an Ockhamist
transition structure. However, it is also possible that ts  mcts(M ) although we have⋃
Tr(h)∈ts h = M as required byDefinition 13, and in that caseM ts is not anOckhamist
transition structure.13 Validity with respect to the class of all transition structures M ts
with ts ⊆ mcts(M ) coincides with validity with respect to the class of all so-called
bundled trees rather than with Ockhamist validity. A bundled tree B = 〈M,<, B〉 is
a BT structure M = 〈M,<〉 together with a non-empty set B of histories such that
for every moment m ∈ M , there is a history h ∈ B such that m ∈ h. A bundled tree
is the Ockhamist equivalent to a transition structure: a bundled tree includes a set of
primitive histories that spans the entire set of moments, while a transition structure
includes a set of primitive consistent, downward closed transition sets that covers the
whole structure.
Definition 17 (Bundled tree) A bundled tree is a triple B = 〈M,<, B〉, where
M = 〈M,<〉 is a BT structure and B ⊆ hist(M ) a non-empty set of histories such
that for every moment m ∈ M , there is some h ∈ B such that m ∈ h. A bundled tree
B = 〈M,<, B〉 is said to be complete iff B = hist(M ).
In a model B = 〈B, vo〉 on a bundled tree B = 〈M,<, B〉, sentences φ ∈ Lo are
evaluated at moment-history pairs m/T with m ∈ M and h ∈ B such that m ∈ h.
That is, only histories h ∈ B are taken into account in the semantic evaluation, and
the domain of quantification of the inevitability operator o is likewise restricted
to the set B. We use B,m/h o φ in order to indicate that a sentence φ ∈ Lo
is true at a pair m/h in a model B = 〈B, vo〉 on a bundled tree B = 〈M,<, B〉
with vo : At × {m/T | m ∈ M and h ∈ B s.t. m ∈ h} → {0, 1} according to the
(restricted) Ockhamist semantics. The notation extends to B o φ, B o φ and bo φ
in the obvious way.
There is a natural one-to-one correspondence between transition structures
M ts = 〈M,<, ts〉 with ts ⊆ mcts(M ) and bundled trees B = 〈M,<, B〉 with
B = {h ∈ hist(M ) | Tr(h) ∈ ts}. Note that the structure B = 〈M,<, B〉 with
B = {h ∈ hist(M ) | Tr(h) ∈ ts} is a bundled tree according to Definition 17 if and
only if the structure M ts = 〈M,<, ts〉 with ts ⊆ mcts(M ) is a transition structure
according to Definition 13: we have that for everym ∈ M , there is some history h ∈ B
such that m ∈ h iff for every m ∈ M , there is some maximal consistent transition set
Tr(h) ∈ ts such that H(Tr(h)) ∩ Hm = ∅. Obviously, the bundled tree B = 〈M,<, B〉
with B = {h ∈ hist(M ) | Tr(h) ∈ ts} is complete if and only if ts = mcts(M ).
13 Consider aBT structureM that contains a history h∗ isomorphic to the natural numbersN such that at any
momentmi ∈ h∗ with i ∈ N, there is a history hi such that h∗ ⊥mi hi , and hist(M ) = {h∗}∪{hi | i ∈ N}.
The structure M ts with ts = {Tr(hi ) | i ∈ N} is a transition structure according to Definition 13, but it is
not an Ockhamist transition structure as ts = mcts(M ) \ {Tr(h∗)}.
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We show that a transition structure M ts = 〈M,<, ts〉 with ts ⊆ mcts(M ) validates a
sentence φ ∈ Lt if and only if the corresponding bundled tree B = 〈M,<, B〉 with
B = {h ∈ hist(M ) | Tr(h) ∈ ts} validates its Ockhamist translation φ∗ ∈ Lo.
Proposition 8 Let M ts = 〈M,<, ts〉 be a transition structure with ts ⊆ mcts(M ),
and let B = 〈M,<, B〉 be the bundled tree with B = {h ∈ hist(M ) | Tr(h) ∈ ts}.
The mapping ξ : 〈M ts, vt〉 → 〈B, vo〉 with vt(p,m/Tr(h)) = vo(p,m/h) for all
p ∈ At, m ∈ M and h ∈ B s.t. m ∈ h is a bijection between transition models on
M ts and bundled tree models on B . The following holds: given a transition model
Mts = 〈M ts, vt〉, for every φ ∈ Lt, every m ∈ M and every h ∈ B s.t. m ∈ h:
Mts,m/Tr(h) t φ iff ξ(Mts),m/h o φ∗.
Proof The proof runs by induction on the structure of a sentence φ ∈ Lt. Given the
correspondence ξ , the base clause is straightforward. The case for P is trivial, and the
case for S dissolves due to the validity of the equivalence Sp ↔ p. In the case of the
future operator F and the inevitability operator , the proof makes use of the fact that
B = {h ∈ hist(M ) | Tr(h) ∈ ts} and H(Tr(h)) = {h} for all h ∈ B. unionsq
From Proposition 8 it follows that validity with respect to the class of all transition
structures M ts with ts ⊆ mcts(M ) is equivalent to validity with respect to the class of
all bundled trees, as there is a natural one-to-one correspondence between the elements
of those two classes. Since by the correspondence result established in Proposition 7
the former class can be characterized by the disjunction Fp ∨ F¬p, bundled tree
validity is definable in the transition semantics.
Corollary 4 For every φ ∈ Lt:
(for all M ts s.t. M ts t Fp ∨ F¬p, M ts t φ) iff bo φ∗.
Proof Follows from Propositions 7 and 8. unionsq
As is well known, however, validity with respect to the class of all bundled trees is
distinct from Ockhamist validity.14 Ockhamist validity is validity with respect to the
class of all complete bundled trees. While bo implies o, the opposite direction does
not hold. In order to define Ockhamist validity in the transition semantics, we need
to single out from the class of all transition structures M ts with ts ⊆ mcts(M ) those
for which mcts(M ) ⊆ ts holds as well. In other words, we need to define within the
class of all transition structures M ts such that M ts t Fp ∨ F¬p, the class of those
transition structures M ts for which ts = mcts(M ). By Proposition 8, this amounts to
characterizing the class of complete bundled trees within the class of bundled trees.
In Zanardo et al. (1999) it is shown that although in general it is not possible to
define the class of complete bundled trees within the class of bundled trees, the class
14 For a proof of that claim, see Burgess (1979) and Reynolds (2002). In Reynolds (2002), the sentence
γ := oGo(p → ♦oFo p) → ♦oGo(p → Fo p) is provided, and it is shown that o γ but  bo γ . The
problem is connected with the so-called limit closure property of complete bundled trees.
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of complete bundled trees can be defined within the class of all bundled trees that are
such that the intersection of any two histories contains a greatest element. Condition
(BT2) of Definition 1 guarantees that this is here the case. It is the requirement that
any two moments have a greatest common lower bound, that we have inserted in order
to be able to define branching points, which figure as the initials of our transitions,
in a perspicuous way, that allows us to apply the correspondence result provided in
Zanardo et al. (1999). On the basis of that result, we can characterize the class of
Ockhamist transition structures within the class of all transition structures M ts with
ts ⊆ mcts(M ) andhence defineOckhamist validitywith respect to ourBTstructures in
the transition semantics. Let δ := FGp∧♦F¬p → ♦F(Gp∧H(¬p → F¬p))
withG = ¬F¬ andH = ¬P¬ be theLt- correspondent of the characterizing formula
provided in Zanardo et al. (1999).
Corollary 5 For every φ ∈ Lt:
(for all M ts s.t. M ts t Fp ∨ F¬p and M ts t δ, M ts t φ) iff o φ∗.
Proof “⇒”: Since Fo p ∨ Fo¬p and δ∗ are Ockhamist validities, by Corollary 3, we
have that mctst Fp ∨ F¬p and mctst δ. From the assumption it thus follows that
mctst φ, which implies by Corollary 3 that o φ∗.
“⇐”: Assume that o φ∗. By Corollary 3, it follows that mctst φ. Let
M ts = 〈M,<, ts〉 be a transition structure s.t. M ts t Fp ∨ F¬p and M ts t δ.
By Proposition 7, M ts t Fp ∨ F¬p implies ts ⊆ mcts(M ). Let B = 〈M,<, B〉 be
the bundled tree with B = {h ∈ hist(M ) | Tr(h) ∈ ts}. By Proposition 8 it follows
that B o δ∗, which by the result provided in Zanardo et al. (1999) implies that B is
complete, i.e., B = hist(M ), and hence we also have ts = mcts(M ). Since mctst φ,
it follows that M ts t φ. unionsq
4.4 Extending Extant Approaches
The results provided in Sects. 4.2 and 4.3 above demonstrate that both Peirceanism and
Ockhamism can be captured in the transition framework.With the notion of a transition
structure at our disposal, we can show that the transition semantics unifies the Peircean
and the Ockhamist account and generalizes both of them. Both Peirceanism and Ock-
hamism turn out as limiting cases of the transition approach that are obtained by
placing suitable restrictions on the transition sets employed in the semantic evaluation
and, thus, by restricting the class of transition structures. Peircean validity coincides
with validity with respect to the empty transition set, i.e. with respect to the class of
all Peircean transition structures. Ockhamist validity, on the other hand, is equivalent
to validity with respect to all maximal consistent transition sets, i.e. with respect to
the class of all Ockhamist transition structures. Both Peircean and Ockhamist validity
are definable in the transition semantics. Whereas the transition semantics in its most
general form, as spelled out in Sect. 3.2, exploits the entire range of consistent, down-
ward closed transition sets a BT structure has to offer, Peirceanism and Ockhamism
each rest upon only a proper subset thereof.
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The transition semantics does, however, not only generalize both Peirceanism and
Ockhamism but also exceeds both accounts with respect to expressive strength. On
the Peircean account, where the semantic evaluation depends solely on a moment
parameter, inevitability and truth coincide: a sentence cannot be true without its truth
being inevitable. The equivalence p ↔ p and hence also Sp ↔ p are valid in
every Peircean transition structure. On the Ockhamist account, where the semantic
evaluation at amoment is in addition relativized to a complete possible course of events,
inevitability and truth come apart, but stability and truth still coincide: a sentence
cannot be true without being stably-true. In every Ockhamist transition structure,
the equivalence Sp ↔ p is valid. Neither on the Peircean nor on the Ockhamist
account is an instance of Sp ∧ S¬p satisfiable. Since, compared to the transition
semantics, Peirceanism and Ockhamism build on limited resources only, the stability
operator loses its power: neither Peirceanism nor Ockhamism allow for quantification
over proper future extensions. On the Peircean account, we are provided with just
a single transition set, and the maximal consistent transition sets that the Ockhamist
account rests on cannot be further extended. Building on the entire range of consistent,
downward closed transition sets, the transition semantics allows for amorefine-grained
picture of the interrelation of modality and time and gains expressive means that are
not available on either of those accounts.
Zanardo (1998) provides a branching time semantics, which aims at retrieving the
resources provided by a BT structure and generalizes both Peirceanism and Ock-
hamism, just as the transition approach does. On Zanardo’s account, sentences are
evaluated on so-called I -trees, which are BT structures M = 〈M,<〉 together with an
indistinguishability function I that assigns to each moment m ∈ M a partition of the
setHm of histories containing that moment. In a model on an I -tree, the semantic eval-
uation is relativized to pairs consisting of a moment m ∈ M and an equivalence class
modulo indistinguishability [h]Im at that very moment. In case the indistinguishability
relation is the relation of undividedness, evaluating a sentence at an index m/[h]Im
amounts to evaluating the sentence at the moment m with respect to the downward
completion of the singleton of the transition 〈m [h]m〉 in the transition semantics.15
Just as the transition semantics, the I -tree framework thus allows for the relativization
of the semantic evaluation to incomplete possible courses of events. However, unlike
in the transition semantics, in the I -tree framework, indistinguishability classes cannot
be shifted independently of the moment of evaluation: a sentence cannot be evaluated
at a moment with respect to an indistinguishability class at another moment. Quanti-
fying over extensions of a given transition set while keeping the moment of evaluation
fixed, as in the case of the stability operator, is therefore not possible in the I -tree
framework. It is not only by employing a second parameter of truth that can capture
an incomplete possible course of events, but also by allowing that second parameter
to vary independently of the moment parameter that the transition semantics gains
its expressive power. Due to that combination the transition allows for a perspicuous
treatment of future contingents.
15 Note that the transition semantics also allows for consistent, downward closed transition sets that do not
contain a greatest element.
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A future contingent is a sentence about the future used in a context in which its truth
value is not yet settled. Whether the sentence is true or false in that context depends
on how the future unfolds. It is true in one possible future but false in another, with
nothing yet deciding between those possibilities. On the Peircean account, where truth
coincides with inevitability, all future contingents are rendered false at the moment
of the context of use. The recurring problem of Ockhamism is that the history para-
meter cannot be initialized in a context of use: while the context of use provides a
unique moment of use, it cannot single out one of the histories passing through that
moment.16 Due to the mismatch between the parameters employed in the recursive
semantics and the parameters provided by a context of use, Ockhamism is in need of a
postsemantics that links the recursive semantic machinery to a context of use.17 There
are two popular postsemantic accounts for Ockhamism: supervaluation, as put forth
in Thomason (1970), and assessment-sensitivity, as provided in MacFarlane (2003,
2014). InMacFarlane’s assessment-sensitive postsemantics, stand-alone sentences are
evaluated at a pair consisting of a moment of usemu and a later moment of assessment
ma . The moment of assessment provides a second perspective from which the truth of
a future contingent at the moment of use can be retrospectively assessed. A sentence
is said to be postsemantically-true if and only if it is true at the moment of use mu
with respect to all histories containing the moment of assessment ma according to
the Ockhamist semantics.18 Supervaluation can be viewed as a special case of the
assessment-sensitive postsemantics, viz. the case in which the moment of assessment
ma is identical to the moment of use mu .
Since in the transition semantics truth values are assigned at a moment with respect
to a consistent, downward closed set of transitions rather than with respect to an entire
history, it is possible to extract an initial value for the second parameter of truth from
a context of use. A sentence can be evaluated at a moment with respect to its past: the
context of use specifies the moment of usemu , which in turn determines the setTr(mu)
of transitions preceding that moment. Moreover, the transition semantics allows us to
express that a future contingent is contingent with respect to the parameters provided
by the context of use, and the stability operator provides a means to specify how and
how far the future has to unfold for its truth value at the moment of use to become
settled. Future contingents are neither stably-true nor stably-false at the moment of
use mu with respect to the transition set Tr(mu) that captures the past course of events
up to that moment. If a future contingent is stably-true relative to an indexmu/Tr(ma),
the moment ma constitutes a suitable moment of assessment in MacFarlane’s sense.
The transition semantics provides a second perspective from which the truth value
of a future contingent at the moment of use can be retrospectively assessed within
the semantics itself. No postsemantics and no additional parameters are needed. By
exploiting the entire range of consistent, downward closed sets of transitions a BT
structure has to offer and allowing the stability operator to quantify over extensions
16 For a discussion of the problem that a context of use fails to provide an initial value for the Ockhamist
history parameter, see Belnap et al. (2001).
17 The helpful term ‘postsemantics’ was coined by MacFarlane (2003).
18 Belnaps’s theory of double time references makes use of a similar idea. See Belnap (2002).
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of a given transition set, the transition semantics enables us to capture the behavior of
the truth value of a future contingent in the course of time.
5 Conclusion
In the transition semantics, the parameters of truth are provided by a moment and
a consistent, downward closed set of transitions, which can represent a partial or
complete possible course of events. In addition to temporal and modal operators, the
transition language is equipped with a stability operator, which is interpreted as a
universal quantifier over the possible extensions of a given transition set. The stability
operator allows us to specify how and how far time has to unfold for the truth value of
a sentence at a moment to become settled and thereby enables a perspicuous treatment
of future contingents.
The transition semantics generalizes and extends bothPeirceanismandOckhamism.
Both accounts are limiting cases of the transition approach that can be obtained by
placing suitable restrictions on the transition sets employed in the semantic evaluation.
Restricting the semantic evaluation to the empty transition set yields Peirceanism with
its sole dependence on themoment parameter, while a restriction tomaximal consistent
transition sets yields Ockhamism with its dependence on moment-history pairs. On
both accounts, stability collapses into truth.Operating on thewhole range of consistent,
downward closed transition sets provided by a BT structure, the transition semantics
with its stability operator gains expressivemeans that are not available on either of those
accounts and provides a fine-grained picture of the interrelation of modality and time.
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